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For a non-cooperative game Nash [5] proposes a concept of equilibrium which is well-known
presently as the Nash equilibrium point (NEP): For simplicity we consider a two-person game,
Let $M_{\mathrm{i}}(x_{>}y)$ be the expected payoff of player $i(=1, 2)$ when player 1 and 2 follow mixed
strategies $\chi$ and $y$ respectively. The pair of strategies ( $x^{\mathrm{r}}$ , $y$ . ) for both players is a NEP if and
only if the following relations hold.
$M_{1}$ ( $x^{\nu}$ , $y$ )$*=M_{1}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}(x,$ $y^{t})$ (1)
$x$
$M_{2}$ ( $\chi^{*}$ , $)’.)= \max_{M_{2}}(x^{\mathrm{P}}$ , $y)$ (2)
$y$
The NEP is commonly used in the area of micro economics, but has the following problems :
$(\mathrm{P}1)$ Many non-cooperative games have two or more NEPs. In such a case the NEP can not become
a guiding principle for a player to select his desirable strategy.
$(\mathrm{p}2)$ In many game experiments it is reported that even if th e game has a unique NEP many
players do not use their Nash $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{q}\dot{\mathrm{u}}$ ilibrium strategy. For example, Minas et al [3] reports




prisoner’s dilemma game in which (defection, defection) is a unique NEP.
For the pu rpose of resolving the first problem $(\mathrm{P}1)$ , many investigations have been
performed in two directions :
(a) The purification of equilibria :Selten [6] defines a $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}^{-}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}$ Nash equilibrium for a
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dynamic game with complete information. Harsanyi [1] defines a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
for a static game with incomplete information. Furthermore a perfect Bayesian equilibrium is
defined for a dynamic game with incomplete information.
$\langle \mathrm{b})$ The selection of a desirable equilibrium :Selten and Harsanyi $[\acute{2}]$ try to structure a general
theory with respect to the selection of a unique NEP in a $\mathrm{n}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}^{-}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}$game by introducing
five concepts (1) the payoff dominance (2). the risk dominance (3) tracing procedure (4)
isomorphism and (5) subgame consistency.
For the purpose of resolving the second problem $(\mathrm{P}2)$ , Nakai [4] proposes a subjective game.
Considering subjective distributions on some motives, he explains the variety of strategies selected
by players.
In this paper we propose a $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}\neg$ of ind icating a desirable strategy for a player by combining a
subjective game with the payoff and risk dominances. We call this method by the SEMD method
( the selection of an equilibrium by motive distributions ), This method weeds out the less desirable
NEPs by two criteria, the payoff dominance and the risk dominan ce, calculates probabilities of
realization for all possible NEP $\mathrm{s}$ based on the subjective motive distributions, and finally asserts
that it is desirable for a player to select the strategy indicated by the NEP having the maximum
probability of realization. This method is not perfect, that is, it may ocgur that it can not select a
unique NEP strictly, but this method is quite useful for many cases. We give some numerical
examples for the explanation of the SEDM method. In one of them we can see that taking into
account motive distributions, a point not being a NEP of the original game may be selected as a
desirable point. Therefore we can explain the variety of selections of players. Thus we can somewhat
resolve the above two problems ($\mathrm{p}$ $1\rangle$ and $(\mathrm{P}2)$ by the SEM $\mathrm{D}$ method.
2. THE “SEMD” METH OD




$G|.$ playerl $\alpha_{m}\alpha_{1}..\cdot\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}_{(a,n1,b_{\hslash 11})}^{(a11,.b_{11})}.\cdot$ $(a_{m;}’‘,\cdot.b_{m\prime\iota})(a\mathrm{z}_{1}.b_{1\prime 1})’)$ (3)
where $a_{ij}(b_{ij})$ denotes the payoff of player 1(2 ), given that player 1 and 2 use pure strategies
$Ct_{i}$ and $\beta_{j}$ respectively $(\mathrm{i}=1,\cdots,m ; j=1,\cdots n)f$ We consider that each player selects his strategy
under one of $l$ motives $m1_{\rangle}m2,\cdots$ , $m\iota$ . We can give some examples of motives as follow $\mathrm{s}$ :
$m1$ : maximization of his own payoff ( selfish motive )
$m2$ : maximization of the social payoff ( the sum of $\mathrm{b}\mathrm{o}1,1_{1}$ player’s payoff)( coexistent motive )
$m3$ : minimization of tl$\iota \mathrm{e}$ opponent’s payoff
$l4$ : maximization of the winning probability
$m\mathit{5}$ :maximization of the probability of not losing
ma:maximization of th e difference between his own payoff and the opponent’s payoff
Let $a_{ij}^{s}$ $(b_{\mathrm{i}j}^{s})$ be the payoff of player )(2) when player 1 and 2 select the pure strategies $\alpha_{i}$ and $\beta_{j}$
respectively and when player 1(2) follow the motive $m_{s}$ , for example,
$a_{ij}^{1}=a_{\mathrm{i}j}$ $a_{ij}^{2}=a_{tj}+b_{\mathrm{i}j}$
$a_{ij}^{3}=-b_{\mathrm{i}j}$ $a_{1j}^{4}=$ $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{n}(a_{U}-b_{\mathrm{i}j})^{+}$ (4)
$a_{\dot{\iota}j}^{\mathit{5}}=1-\mathrm{s}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{n}(b_{l_{J}}-a_{jj})^{+}$ $a_{tj}^{6}=a_{lJ}-b_{ij}$






and $x^{+}$ is the positive part of $x$ , that is, $x^{+}= \max\{x_{\}0\}$ .
We consider a certain player $\mathrm{P}$ (1 or 2) $)$ and assume that the player $\mathrm{P}$ think$\mathrm{c}\mathrm{s}$ that player ]
follow $\mathrm{s}$ a motive distribution $\lambdarightarrow-\langle\lambda_{1},, ..,\lambda_{f}\rangle$ and that player 2 follows a motive distribution
$\theta=\langle\theta_{1},\cdots,\theta_{l}\rangle$ where 2, $(\theta_{s})$ is a probability that the player $\mathrm{P}$ thinks that player 1( 2 ) follows the
motive $m_{s}$ . We define a subjective game of the player $\mathrm{P}$ by the bimatri
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$G_{p}(\lambda, \theta)=[(\tilde{a}_{iJ},$ $b\sim lj)|1\leq i\leq m$ , $1\leq$ $\mathrm{i}\leq n]$ (6)
where $\tilde{a}_{l}=\sum_{\mathrm{J}-\downarrow}^{/}i\lambda_{\mathrm{J}}a_{ij}^{s}$ and $\tilde{b}_{\mathrm{j}j}=\sum_{s-1}^{l}\theta_{s}b_{\mathrm{i}j}^{s}$ .
That is to say, the player $\mathrm{P}$ feels sure that he faces to his subjective game $G_{P}(\lambda_{2}\theta)$ .
Selten and Harsanyi [2] introduce concepts of the payoff dominance and the risk dominance.
DEFINITION 1. A NEP ( $x’$ , $y.$ ) payoff dominates strictly another NEP $(\tilde{x},\tilde{y})$ if and only if
$M_{\mathit{1}}(x^{\alpha},$ $y./\}>M_{l}(\tilde{x},\tilde{y})$ for $i=1$ , 2 (7)
which denotes that the NEP guaranteeing more expected payoffs to both players is desirable.
DEFINITION 2. A NEP ( $x.$ , $y$ . ) risk dominates strictly another NEP $(\tilde{x}_{\mathrm{J}}\tilde{y})$ if and only if
$\{M_{1}$ ( $x^{\mathrm{s}}$ , $y.)-M_{1}(\tilde{x},$ $y^{\mathrm{r}})\}\{M_{2}(x^{s}$ , $y.)$ $-M_{2}(x’,\tilde{y})\}$
(8)
$>\{M_{1}(\tilde{x},\tilde{y})-M_{1}(x*,\tilde{y})\}\{M_{2}(\tilde{x},\tilde{y})-M_{\mathrm{z}}(\tilde{x},$ $y.)\}$
which denotes that the product of losses for players’ deviations from the NEP ( $x^{\mathrm{r}}$ , $y^{*}$ ) is larger
than the corresponding prod uct from the NEP $(\tilde{x}_{J}\tilde{y})$ . The inequality (8) means that both player $\mathrm{s}$
consider that the NEP $(\tilde{\chi},\tilde{y})$ is more risky than the NEP $(x^{t},$ $\mathrm{y}^{\mathrm{r}})$ .
Next we propose the SE$\mathrm{E}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{D}$ meth od indicating a desirable equilibrium to the player P. We put
$K=$ {( $\tau$ , $j$ ) $|1\leq \mathrm{i}\leq l$ , $1\leq j\leq l\mathrm{i}$ , $\mathrm{j}$ : integer} (9)
$\overline{1^{\urcorner}<\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}-$ ( $\iota^{i}$ , $–,-j\overline{)\in}I\zeta$let $G_{ij}$ bethe $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{b}\overline{\mathrm{j}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}}\mathrm{e}-$ game when player Iand—-Dfollow $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}--$ $m_{l}-$ and $-\overline{m_{f}}$
respectively. Furthermore let $S_{\mathrm{t}/}$ be the set of NEP $\mathrm{s}$ of the subjective game $G_{ij}$ . We put
$S$ $=$ $\cup s_{\mathrm{i}j}$ . (10)
$(j$ , $jEK$
For any subjective game $G_{lj}$ let $\tilde{S}_{tj}$ be the set of NE Ps which are not payoff and risk dominated by
other $\dot{\mathrm{N}}$EPs of the game $G_{iJ}$ . For a pair $(x_{l}y)$ of strategies of both players in the game $G_{t}$. we




where $||\tilde{s}_{lj}||$ is the number of elements of th18 set $\tilde{S}_{ij}$ .
(J1)
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Let 2 (d) be the motive distribution of player 1(2) which the player $\mathrm{P}$ thinks. We consider that
when there are two or more NEPs, each NEP occurs with equal probability. Then the realization
probability of NEP $(x, y)$ for the player $\mathrm{P}$ is given by
$p(x, y)=\S^{\lambda_{i}\theta_{J}I_{lj}(X}(i_{1}’ y)$ . (12)
Therefore we consider that the player $\mathrm{P}$ should aim at the realization of the NEP ( $x^{\mathrm{g}}$ , $y^{\mathrm{r}}$ ) having
the $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{i}_{1}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{m}$ realization probability that is,
$p$ $(x.,$ $y’)= \max_{x_{J}(y\in S}$ $p(x, y)$ . (13)
Summarizing the above discussion, we obtain the SEM $\mathrm{D}$ method as follows :
The SEM $\mathrm{D}$ method
Step 1: We obtain all NEPs of all subjective games $G_{1J}(i, j=1,\cdots,l)$ .
Step 2: For each $G_{t_{J}}$ we weed out a NEP which is payoff dominated by another NEP of
$G_{ij}$ .
Step 3: For each $G_{ij}$ we weed out aNEP which is risk dominated by another NEP of $G_{ij}$ ,
(Note that the payoff dominance takes priority over the risk dominance.)
Step 4: For each of the remained NEPs, we calculate its realization probability based on
motive distribution 2 and 0 of both players which are subjective thought of
lhe player P.
Step 5: The player $\mathrm{P}$ should select the strategy indicated by $11_{1}\mathrm{e}$ NEP having the maximum
xealization probability.
3. NUM ERICAL EXAMPLES
In this section we show two numerical examples. Example 1 explains the application of the SEMD
method for selecting one of three NEPs. Example 2 shows that even though the original game has a
unique NEP, the selected equilibrium point may vary according to motive distributions of both
players
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$\mathrm{G}$ : player 1
$\alpha_{2}$
Fig.l The game in Example 1
This game $\mathrm{G}$ has three NEPs, A $=(\langle 1,0\}, \{0,1\rangle)$ $B=(\{0,1\rangle, \langle 1,0\rangle)$ and
$C=(\{1/3,2/3\rangle, \{]/3,2/3\})$ at which the pairs of expected payoff of both players are given by
$(2,3)$ , $(4, 1)$ and $(2, 1)$ respectively. None of them are payoff dominated by another one. We
shall compare these NEPs from the viewpoint of risk dominance. Table 1 shows the pairs of
expected payoff for strategies selected by both players. For example, if player 1 and 2 select
strategies $\langle\rfloor/3,2/3\rangle$ and $\langle$1, 0) respectively, the expected payoffs ofplayer 1 and 2 are 10/3 and 1
respectively.
From Table 1 we know that th e NEPs A and $\mathrm{B}$ risk dominate the NEP $\mathrm{C}$ and that there is no risk
dominance relation between A and B. Then Nash equilibrium points can not be yet limited to a
unique one, As criteria for selecting a strategy we consider two motives, $m_{1}\acute{\langle}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{h}$ motive) and
$m_{2}$
(coexistent motive), which are defined in the previous section. Because $G_{11}=G$ , the subjective
game $G_{11}$ has two realizable NEPs A and $\mathrm{B}$ , this is, $S_{11}=\{\mathrm{A}, B\}$ .
player 2
$\alpha_{1}$
$G_{12}$ : player 1
$\alpha_{2}$
Fig.2 The subjective game $G_{12}$
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$\prime 1^{\urcorner}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}$ subjective game $G_{12}$ is given by Figure 2 and has three NEPs $\mathrm{A}$ , $\mathrm{B}$ and
$D=(\langle 2/3,1/3\rangle, \langle 1/3,2/3\rangle)$ . The NEP $\mathrm{D}$ is payoff dominated by B. Moreover the NE$\mathrm{E}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{B}$ risk
domin ates A. Thus $G_{12}$ has a unique realizable NEP $\mathit{1}\mathit{3}=$ $(\langle 0, 1\rangle, \langle 1, 0\rangle)$ , that is, $\tilde{S}_{12}=\{B\}$ .
player 2
$\beta_{1}$ $\beta_{2}$
$\alpha_{1}$ 3, 1 $5,|.3|$
$G_{21}$ : player 1
$\alpha_{2}$ 5, $\rfloor$ $1_{|,|},,0$,|}
Fig.3 Thhe subjective game; $G_{21}$
Similarly the subjective game $G_{\mathrm{Z}1}$ is given by Figure 3 and has three NEPs $\mathrm{A}$ , $\mathrm{B}$ and
$E=(\langle 1/3,2/3\}, \{2/3,1/3\rangle)$ . The NEP $\mathrm{E}$ is payoff dominated by A2 but there is no payoff dominan ce
relation between A and B. Moreover th e NEP A risk dominates B. Thus $G_{21}$ has a unique
realizable NEP A $=(\langle 1_{2}0\rangle)\{0, 1\})$ , that is, $\tilde{S}_{\mathrm{Z}1}=\{\mathrm{A}\}$ .
player 2
$\alpha_{1}$
$G_{22}$ : player 1
$\alpha_{2}$
Fig.4 The subjective game $G_{22}$
$\ulcorner \mathrm{f}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}$ subjective game $G_{\mathrm{z}\mathrm{z}}$ is given by Figure 4 and has three NEPs $\mathrm{A}$ , $\mathrm{B}$ and
$F$ $=(\langle 2/3,1/3\rangle, \langle 2/3,1/3\rangle)$ . The NEP $\mathrm{F}$ is payoff dominated by A and $\mathrm{B}$ , but there is no payof $\mathrm{f}$
dominance relation between A and B. Moreover the NEP $\mathrm{F}$ is risk dominated by A and B. Thus
$G_{22}$ has two realizable NEPs A and B2 that is, $\tilde{S}_{22}=\{\mathrm{A}, B\}$ .
Now we consider a certain player $\mathrm{P}$ (1 or 2) and let $\langle\lambda, 1-\lambda\rangle$ $(\{\theta, 1-\theta\rangle)$ be the motive
distribution of player 1( 2 ) that th e player $\mathrm{P}$ thinks. That is to say, $\lambda$ $(\theta)$ is a probability that the
player $\mathrm{P}$ thinks that player 1(2 ) follows the motive $m_{1}$ . Then we can obtain the realization






Then if $\lambda$ $\{\begin{array}{l}><\end{array}\}$ $\theta$ , then $p(\mathrm{A})\{_{>}^{<}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} P(B)$ .
Therefore if player 1 is more selfish than 2, then the player $\mathrm{P}$ should aim to the NEP B. If the player
$\mathrm{P}$ is player 1( 2 ), he should select the pure strategy $\alpha_{2}(\beta_{1})$ . Thus considering subjective games we
could limit many equilibrium points to a um que one.
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